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Fact and Fantasy in Soviet Records:
The Documentation of Soviet Party and Secret
Police Investigations as Historical Evidence
My book One Day We Will Live without Fear: Everyday Lives Under the
Soviet Police State presents a number of true stories from the archives ofthe former Soviet Union.1 Drawing on events from the 1930s through the1970s, these stories show how, by accident or design, people becameentangled in the workings of Soviet rule. In the process I outline andillustrate the seven principles on which that police state operated duringits history, from the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 to the collapse of theSoviet Union in 1991. Well-known people appear in the stories, but thecentral characters are those who will have been remembered only withintheir families: a budding artist, an engineer, a pensioner, a governmentoffice worker, a teacher, a group of tourists. Their tales, based onhistorical records, shine a light on the many tragic, funny, and bizarreaspects of Soviet life.Each of my stories arises from the records of an investigation by eitherthe Party Control Commission or the KGB (Committee of State Security).This raises an important question: can the records of these bodies betrusted? Did party investigators really take the trouble to establish thefacts without fear or favor? Did Soviet secret policemen not manufacturefantastic threats and invent fictitious agents in order to impress superiorsand win funding, like Our Man in Havana? In Graham Greene’s novel of1958, a British businessman in need of funds becomes a spy. To please hisnew paymaster he develops a fictitious agent network using the names oflocal people whom he meets accidentally, and reports important militaryinstallations using diagrams of vacuum cleaner parts.2
1 Harrison, One Day We Will Live Without Fear.
2 Greene, Our Man in Havana.
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Could an NKVD officer do that and get away with it? It is true thatmany investigative documents of the Soviet era, and especially fromStalin’s time, contain claims for which there was no independentevidence. These often concerned attributions of treasonous intention tocommit particular acts or allegations of conspiracy to carry them out.Many such allegations were fabricated. The story of StanislavBronikovsky (chapter 1) revolves around just such a fabricated claim. Theweaving of lies by investigators charged with establishing the truth hasled some historians to view Stalin as a “weak dictator.” Although Stalin’shand can be found in every major decision of the Soviet state over threedecades, perhaps he was not truly in control because he could not controlthe propensity to lie of those from whom he needed to hear the facts.The weak-dictator hypothesis merits a short digression. It is conciselystated by James Harris in his review article, “Was Stalin a Weak Dictator?”An earlier version of the same argument, much-cited, is by J. Arch Getty,
Origins of the Great Purges. Getty returned to the subject in “The Politics ofRepression,” suggesting that in 1937 Yezhov “pursued initiatives,prepared dossiers, and pushed certain investigations in order to promotehis own agenda” which “may not have been identical” with Stalin’s.3Much of the case for Stalin’s supposed weakness, however, is based onattacking a straw man: the idea that the Great Terror was the culminationof a long-term plan to imprison or murder millions of people that Stalinfollowed over several years, at least from the murder of Leningrad partychief Sergei Kirov in 1934. There is no evidence that Stalin had such along-term plan, so advocates of the weak-dictator hypothesis swing fromone extreme to another, concluding that Stalin was pushed ormanipulated by others into mass murder.This is a false alternative. For Stalin, terror was an instrument, not agoal. He did not have a long-term plan for mass murder, but he did have
3 The quoted words are by Getty “The Politics of Repression,” pp. 59–60. See also Getty, Origins of the Great Purges, and Harris, “Was Stalin aWeak Dictator?”
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stable objectives for national power and his own security and the capacityto pursue them in ways that changed as his information changed.4 At acertain point, mass murder was the result.At the same time, the reliability of particular historical records cannotbe resolved by debates at such a high level of abstraction. Cautioushistorians have rightly raised concerns about the private agendas of theinvestigators. Did the secret police of Stalin’s time, for example, not inventunderground networks and conspiracies so as to justify their ownemployment and extract more funding from their political masters? Anddoes this not introduce uncontrollable distortions into the documentaryrecord?Because this is such an important question, it makes sense to considerthe veracity of the documentation underlying this book in some detail.Can the documents be trusted to tell us the truth? No. No documentdeserves unconditional trust. Can the documents be analyzed to extract areliable message? Can we identify fact from distortion? Yes. Myconfidence is based on arguments that I will set out briefly.First, every record has a message; the problem is to work out what itis. According to the political scientist Robert Jervis, “Mostcommunications convey two messages: what the actor is saying and thefact that he needs to say it.”5 The craft of the historian who works withdocuments is to triangulate the contents of the document with itsauthorship, with other sources, and with prior knowledge about theauthors, their position in the world as it worked at the time, and theirneed to say what was said.Second, we are dealing with records of investigations where theinvestigator could report the facts selectively, and suppress or inventthem at key points, so as to favor one interpretation over another. This
4 This case is made in more detail by Gregory and Harrison, “AllocationUnder Dictatorship,” pp. 732–733; Gregory, Schröder, and Sonin,"Rational Dictators"; and Harrison, “The Dictator and Defense.”
5 Jervis, “Signaling and Perception,” p. 298.
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creates a dilemma for the reader of any document: where, exactly, didinvention take over from the facts?It is helpful to understand that the investigations carried out by Sovietstate and party officials were not liable to free invention. Invention waspermissible only within strict limits. The limits were handed down fromabove, and corresponded to the revolutionary insights of the partyleaders at the time. These insights could be used to fill in the gapsbetween the facts as they were known and, if necessary, would takepriority over the facts.This is less strange than it might sound. A close analog to the idea of“revolutionary insight” is Stephen Colbert’s invention (on his TV show The
Colbert Report in 2005): “truthiness.” Truthiness, defined in a recent briefto the US Supreme Court, is the quality of something that is “felt to betrue”; it is known by instinct and therefore “without regard to evidence orlogic.”6 (So truthiness goes deeper than mere plausibility orverisimilitude.) Truthy beliefs tend to persist even when they arecontradicted by verified facts. This is because they are felt to be true ingeneral, and such feelings outweigh detailed invalidation.Truthiness may well be a feature of political discourse in everysociety, but the Soviet and American ways of politics differed in animportant respect. In Soviet life, access to claimed truths was entirelymonopolized by the party, and within the party by the leaders. A leaderlike Stalin had revolutionary insight, and you could not be a Soviet leaderwithout it.7 Stalin based important decisions on instinct, that is, onclaimed insights into the true (or “truthy”) state of the world that did notrequire external validation. He worked assiduously to share these insightswith others around him and to ensure that they learned to conform.
6 Shapiro et al., “Truthiness and the First Amendment.”
7 On Stalin and revolutionary insight, see Davies and Harris, Stalin’s
World, pp. 60–61, 79–80.
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Here are Stalin’s revolutionary insights that are most relevant to thisbook. Some of them have already appeared as illustrations of the FirstPrinciple (from chapter 1: your enemy is hiding).
 We have enemies: “We have internal enemies. We have externalenemies. This, comrades, must not be forgotten for a singlemoment.”8
 War can come at any time: “We could not know just when theimperialists would attack the USSR … but that they might attack usat any moment … of that there could be no doubt.”9
 The internal enemy is hand in glove with the foreign enemy: “agang of wreckers, diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies,assassins, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, workingin the pay of the intelligence services of foreign states.”10
 The most dangerous enemy is the one who is already among us:“Wherein lies the strength of the present-day wreckers, theTrotskyites? Their strength lies in the Party card.”11
 When something bad happens, look for the link to the foreignenemy: “He [a mutinous officer] is, of course (of course!), notalone. He must be put up against the wall and forced to talk—totell the whole truth and then severely punished. He must be aPolish-German (or Japanese) agent” (a remark that Stalin madeduring an investigation in 1934).12
 Finally, “truthiness” can be more reliable than the truth, and thereason is that we cannot expect to find independent verification of
8 Stalin, Works, vol. 11, p. 67.
9 Stalin, Works, vol. 13, p. 186.
10 Stalin, Works, vol. 14, p. 252.
11 Stalin, Works, vol. 14, p. 256.
12 For the full story of the so-called Nakhayev affair, see Davies et al.,eds., The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, pp. 240–242, 246–264.
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what we believe: “Experienced conspirators don’t leave behind atrail of documents in their work.”13Stalin used these messages to guide his own fact-finders. He obligatedthem to make certain presumptions. You must presume that anyone canbe an enemy; that anyone who looks loyal can turn out to be anunconscious enemy; that one explanation for gaps in the evidence can bethat enemies cover their tracks; and that among the missing facts may becoordination between domestic and foreign enemies.The prudent investigator would follow these insights when the factswere missing. There were times such as the Great Terror, but not onlythen, when Stalin’s insights would take precedence even though the factscontradicted them. A result was the widespread fabrication of charges,torture, and false confessions. The story of Stanislav Bronikovsky(chapter 1) takes place at one of those times.Thus Soviet investigators were authorized to apply “Soviet truthiness”in the course of their investigations, and the documentary records of theirinvestigations became correspondingly distorted. But there was noauthorization to invent freely. The authority to invent was limited tothose things that would confirm Stalin’s revolutionary insights.Stalin died, and his successors modified his insights. They continued toassert the belief in a homeland encircled and penetrated by enemies thatstrove ceaselessly for the overthrow of communism. But they dispensedwith the infamous notion of the unconscious enemy, and they no longerlooked for the most dangerous enemies inside the party. They continuedto look for the hand of the enemy in every unplanned event andunauthorized initiative. But they sharply increased the burden of proofthat was required to identify the enemy. Suspicion of disloyalty would stilllead to investigation but it would not lead to arrest and punishmentunless independent facts were found that pointed to specificresponsibility, including guilty intention. Thus, there was change as wellas continuity in “Soviet truthiness.”
13 Quoted by Davies and Harris, Stalin’s World, p. 90.
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Stalin was no weak dictator. He and his successors set firm limits onwhat could be asserted as “truthy” (as opposed to what was verifiablytrue). Whatever it was that they believed at the time, they set the samelimits in both secret business and public discourse. They were fully aliveto the possibility that their own officials might push at these limits, andthey used multiple strategies to control them.How, exactly, did Soviet rulers enforce their beliefs on those aroundthem—and specifically on the fact-finders of the party and the secretpolice? How did they ensure that investigators would follow theauthorized presumptions, and not go an inch beyond them?The Soviet system was designed with this in mind. It began withkeeping the fact-finders apart from those they had to investigate.14 Thesecret police, in particular, were an elite group: “Stalin’s praetorians.”15After that, it was important to keep them few in number and close tohand. Stalin kept his fact-finders modestly staffed and funded. As theirnumbers grew he also limited their influence at the center by dividingthem into smaller, more specialized agencies.16 He understood whatmodern democracies forget at their peril: a fact-finding apparatus that isbloated by too much money and too little supervision is dangerousbecause it can attract empire builders who acquire their own vestedinterests and become a political lobby. Stalin wanted conduits of reliableinformation, not rival centers of power. Stalin’s successors took theselessons to heart. We saw in chapter 5 that the KGB, for example, remaineda relatively small organization right up to the last days of the SovietUnion.
14 Discussed by Gregory, Restructuring the Soviet Bureaucracy, pp. 18–23.
15 These words are used by Gregory, Terror by Quota, pp. 33–59.
16 Described by Gregory, Terror by Quota, pp. 98–103; Gregory andBelova, “Dictator, Loyal and Opportunistic Agents”; and Markevich, “HowMuch Control is Enough?”
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The Soviet system of rule also limited the fact-finders’ scope forstraying beyond prescribed limits by denying them the capacity to engagein policy analysis. Stalin never allowed his party investigators or secretpolicemen to criticize policy, form or frame policy choices, or even justconsider broader implications of the facts they found. Analysis was hisprerogative, which no one else could assume. The Party ControlCommission, responsible for investigating wrongdoing by party members,had no right to analyze the conditions that might lead party members todo wrong. When investigating threats to security, the KGB was restrictedto finding facts; it had no right to analyze the factors behind the threats.Here, perhaps, is an important but neglected difference betweenintelligence work in a democracy and under a totalitarian dictator.Americans consider that the intelligence officer has a duty to “speak truthto power,” even when the truth is painful.17 The KGB could not speak truthto power. It could speak only facts. This was a surprising discovery forVadim Bakatin, a provincial party boss whom Gorbachev appointed tobring the KGB under control after the attempted putsch of August 1991.Bakatin did not foresee that as KGB chief he would be expected to handlean avalanche of “almost unprocessed” facts that landed daily on his deskfrom below. The facts that reached him were undigested because it wasnobody’s job to make sense of them before they reached his desk. Helooked for the cause of this and decided that the party itself hadmonopolized the role of data analysis, and did not want to share this rolewith any other body, including the KGB.18This leads me to discount those interpretations of Soviet rule in whicha weak ruler was manipulated by his security officials, who fed theparanoia of the regime with fabricated plots of their own devising inorder to win funding and job security. The Soviet system was designed to
17 Peterson, “What I Learned in 40 Years.”
18 Bakatin, Izbavlenie ot KGB, pp. 44–45.
9
ensure that subordinate officials had neither the freedom of action northe capacity to manage their superiors in this way.Where does this leave us? The documents underlying this book arerecords created by the Soviet rulers’ fact-finders. They were written toserve the rulers, and they must be understood in that light. Those whowrote them shared the rulers’ mind-set, including their “insights” intowhat must be true yet cannot be confirmed. Thus our records showcharacteristic biases that are easily identifiable based on knowledge ofthe period. These biases arise from the investigators’ obligation toconform to the party leaders’ insights and to elaborate on them withoutgoing beyond them by an inch. The biases do not arise from theinvestigators’ preference for framing the rulers’ choices or their desire tomanipulate power from below.19In that light I approach the records of party and KGB investigators thatform the basis of my book: like any historical documents, they requireconsideration of the circumstances and motives of the authors, alwayspaying particular attention to the facts that are missing and the facts thatwere sacrificed to the truthiness of the time and place.
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